Trong quyển tạp chí International Defense Review nó gửi đến nhà tháng này có bài phân tích về khả năng chiến tranh nguyên tử giữa Mỹ và Trung quốc trong tương lai gần, bài này khá hay và rất sát với thực tế, nhất là họ phân tích rất kỹ về khả năng tác chiến của hai bên nếu xảy ra chiến tranh, và một lô những điều mà ít người biết.

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Máy của tôi không có MS Office cũng chả có Scanner

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Mục lục :


1. China revises nuclear strategies.

2. A new China - US nuclear deterrence is taking shape.

3. China readjusts deployment of nuclear weapons.

4. Nuclear capability gap between China and US in actual combat operations.

5. Characteristics of modern nuclear warfare.

China revises nuclear strategies



The Chinese military is quietly revising its existing nuclear strategies and deployment of nuclear forces has also been readjusted accordingly.

Firstly, China's nuclear strategiy has changed from clarity to ambiguity. for a long time since China formally became a nuclear power, China has promulgate the policy of "no first use of nuclear weapons", and no changes have been made in China's legal documents up to the present time. Nonetheless, after 1996 China has for a number of times attempted to impose nuclear deterrence againts the US and Taiwan both strategically and tactically. The remarks of "attaking Los Angeles with nuclear weapons" or "attaking Taiwan with neutron bombs" are clear indicators that China has gradually made its nuclear strike strategies ambigous. Specifically, China's implementation of suc an ambigous nuclear strategy is not to make any official changes at policy level, but to frequently step up nuclear deterrence effort verbally, hoping that its tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear forces can jointly deter Taiwan's independance ans the possible US intervention in the Taiwan Strait conflict.

Secondly, since the mid 1990s, the Chinese military academia has placed greater emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons in containing a possible direct conflict with the US. Articles and commentaries that criticize China's small nuclear arsenal and demand for more effective nuclear deterrence power have appeared frequently on a variety of publications of the Chinese National Defense University and the Academy of Military Science.

Quả bom nguyên tử mà quân đội Mỹ thả xuống Nagasaki hơn nửa thế kỷ trước có sức công phá 20kiloton (tương đương 20.000 tấn thuốc nổ TNT).

Những quả bom nguyên tử thời nay có sức mạnh hàng trăm kiloton, thậm chí được tính bằng megaton, chỉ cần một quả bom như vậy là đủ để "san bằng" một thành phố lớn như Los Angeles hay San Francisco và vùng phụ cận trong vài phút.

In regard to the content of the "effective nuclear deterrence" theory, the focal arguments of the Chinese military strategists are simmarized as follow :

Nuclear capability is at the core of modern deterrence power. The Chinese military strategists assert that "resolute nuclear retaliation" is the most important means of containing a nuclear war. Nuclear deterrence should be integrated with the "progressive defense" strategy. The Chinese strategists advocate that the doctrine of "progressive defense" should be extended to the area of "nuclear counterattack".

Since the late 1990s, China's "nuclear deterrence" theory has placed greater emphasis on maintaining "a limited but effective nuclear defense capability". "Our defense should be progressive in that our nuclear capability is great enough to exert sufficient deterrence against our adversaries".

The Chinese military has stressed since 1980s that China would maintain a "minimum capability for secondary nuclear counterattack". Howerver such a statement no longer or rarely appears on official Chinese media. Today, in the general policy of maintaining a "limited but effective nuclear deterrence capability", emphasis is placed more on the "effectiveness".

The document of the Chinese military has such a comment: "whether in quantity, quality or comprehensive capacity, China's nuclear strength is far behind major Western powers (US). China's nuclear capability still falls short of the requirements of minimum nuclear retaliation sufficient to deter the Western super power from using nuclear weapons on us.

Therefore, the introduction of "progressive defense" doctrine into the area of nuclear weapon developpment should become the theoretical foundation for China to actively strengthen and develop new nuclear weapons.

The recent hard-line comment for a high-level Chinese military officer on the use of nuclear weapons suggests that the Chinese military today has a strong sense of crisis, including that they feel the reliance on conventional deterrence measures is becoming increasingly ineffective in denying Taiwan's independence and the intervention of the US in a Taiwan Strait conflict. Furthermore, should a China-US confrontation upgrade to a nuclear war, China is no longer confident and optimistic about its own nuclear capability.

Besides, the joint development of TMD by the US and Japan, and the latter's NMD technology require a higher penetration capability of China's strategic and campaign tactical land attack missile.

China's nuclear strike theory has undergone a series of changes. The shift from strategic clarity to strategic ambiguity is intended to supplement the inadequat conventional deterrence power. China's doctrine of nuclear weapon development is also under transformation from the initial "minimum secondary nuclear defense capability" to a "limited but effective nuclear defense capability" and today's "effective nuclear counterattack capability".




Chú thích :

TMD : Theater Missile Defense (hệ thống phòng thủ cục bộ bằng tên lửa).
NMD : National Missile Defense (hệ thống phòng thủ quốc gia bằng tên lửa).

Định nghĩa chi tiết về TMD / NMD xem thêm ở đây :

http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1993_h/h930610c.htm